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THE SCOPE OF INDUSTRIAL DESIGN PROTECTION 
UNDER TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION LAWS 
John B. Pegramt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps it was the absence of an effective design I protection statute 
which led to the development in the United States of a mode of protection 
under trademark and unfair competition law. Perhaps it was simply the 
desire to maximize both the manner and term of protection. Whatever the 
cause, it is clear that today, some of the most utilized forms of product 
configuration protection are based on trademark law and are found in the 
Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act). 2 
This Article addresses in four parts the scope of industrial design pro-
tection under trademark and unfair competition laws. In part one, some 
fundamentals of trademark law are reviewed. Part two provides an over-
view of trademark and unfair 'competition protection of product 
configurations. Part three examines the Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 3 The Article concludes with 
a commentary on the appropriateness of protecting product configurations 
under trademark Jaw. 
II. SOME FUNDAMENTALS OF TRADEMARK LAW 
The concepts underlying trademark law and the relevant judicially for-
mulated law of unfair competition4 are similar. Both bodies of law appar-
ently originated in England where purchasers could bring suit against a 
seller of goods for misleading them as to their source. This theory of recov-
ery developed into the tort of "passing off' the goods of one party as those 
of another. S 
The purpose of both trademark and unfair competition law is to protect 
the public, as well as the source of goods identified by the trademark. 6 The 
test for determining infringement in both cases is the likelihood of 
© Copyright 1991, John B. Pegram. 
t A.B .• 1960, Columbia College; LL.B .• 1965. New York University. Partner. Davis Hoxie 
Faithfull & Hapgood. New York. N.Y.; former President, New York Patent. Trademark 
and Copyright Law Association; member of the Editorial Advisory Board and former 
Editor-in-Chief of The Trademark Reporter. 
I. The term "design" is used here in the sense of product configuration and not in the broad 
sense of any symbol or device. . . 
2. 15 US.c. §§ 1051-1127 (1988). 
3. 489 US. 141 (1989). 
4. Other aspects of unfair competiiion law. such as false advertising and antitrust law. are 
beyond the scope of this Article. . 
5. See Bonito 489 US. at 157-58; see also Burrell. Two Hundred Years of English Trade 
Mark Law, in Two HUNDRED YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN PATENT. TRADEMARK 
AND COPYRIGHT LAw. 35. 38-42 (1976) [hereinafter Two HUNDRED YEARS). 
6. But see Bonito. 489 US. at 154. 
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confusion. An underlying issue in each is to identify the borderline between 
that which may be appropriated and protected for the exclusive use of a sin-
gle party, and that which should be free for use by all. 
A trademark is a word, name, symbol, device, or any combination 
thereof, which serves to indicate the source of the product with which it is 
used. 7 The specific source need not be known to the purchasers of the 
trademarked product. Instead, it is sufficient that a single entity exists 
which controls use of the trademark. 8 The ability of a mark9 to indicate the 
source, and to distinguish that source from the source of goods made or dis-
tributed by others, is called distinctiveness. 
A. Trademark Rights Arise Through Use 
In the United States, trademark rights were traditional.ly based upon 
priority of appropriation of the mark and were developed through use. In 
that regard, a term lO was not a trademark until it had been adopted and used 
as an indication of source or origin of the product with which it was used. II 
Unlike patents and copyrights, creativity is not a prerequisite to trademark 
rights, and there are no specific provisions for protection of trademarks in 
the United States Constitution. Following the Supreme Court's rejection of 
legislation as being unconstitutionally broad,12 laws providing for federal 
registration of trademarks were adopted under the commerce clause, per-
mitting the federal government to regulate commerce with foreign nations, 
between the states, and with the Indian tribes. 13 Use of a term as a mark in 
7. 15 U.S.c. § 1127 (1988). In reviewing the definition of "trademark" in this section, the 
United States Trademark Association's Trademark Review Commission "determined that 
the terms 'symbol, or device' should not be deleted or narrowed to preclude regislration 
of such things as ·color, shape, smell, sound, or configuralion which functions as a 
mark." USTA Trademark Review Commission Report and Recommendations to USTA 
President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375,421 (1987) Ihereinafter TRC 
Report]. 
Further, S. REP. No. 515 specifically states thai "the words 'symbol or device,' " in the 
Trademark Revision Act of 1988's revised definition of trademark, are intentionally 
retained "so as not to' preclude the registration of colors, shapes, sounds or 
configuralions where Ihey function as trademarks." S. REP. No. SIS, 100lh Congo 2d 
Sess. 44 (1988). 
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ lOSS, 1127 (1988). 
9. "Mark" is a generic lerm for trademarks which relate to goods or products, service 
marks, certification marks, and collective marks. 15 U.S.c. § 1127 (1988). Because 
this Article deals with configurations of goods, "mark" is used here as an abbreviation 
for trademark. 
10. Trademark attorneys use the word "term" to refer to words or names without indicating 
whether trademark rights exist. 
II. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982). This definition was changed slightly when Ihe Trademark 
Revision Act of 1988 came into effect one year from its approval. I~ U.S.c. § 1127 
(1988). 
12. United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See generally Pattishall, The Constitutional Foundation of 
American Trademark Law, in CELEBRATING THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 63 (1988). 
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commerce of the type regulated by the United States government is a pre-
requisite to federal registration of marks. 14 Federal registrations on the 
"Principal Register" are prima facie evidence of validity, registration, own-
ership, and exclusive rights. IS . 
B. The Spectrum of Protectability 
Although several different categories of terms are recognized in the 
field of word marks, not all are protectable as marks. In fact, protectability 
of terms varies and is primarily dependent upon the degree of distinctive-
ness, ranging from arbitrary and fanciful to suggestive, and then, "not 
merely" descriptive. 
A term which is' "merely" descriptive or generic cannot be appropri-
ated by a single entity as its mark. Merely descriptive and generic terms 
are available for use by all because they describe or constitute the common 
name for the subject product-.- For example, one commentator differentiates 
the categories of teFms as follows: 
APPLE for Apples-generic 
TOMAPPLE for tomato and apple juice-descriptive 
APPLE-A-DAY for vitamin tablets-suggestive 
APPLE computers-fanciful 
KODAK for film-arbitraryl6 
As one can readily see; there exists a peculiar dividing line between 
descriptive terms which are protected, and those which are·not protected 
because they are "merely" descriptive. The location of a term with respect 
to that dividing line depends upon whether the term has acquired "second-
ary meaning." The dividing line marks the boundary of distinctiveness. If 
a term is not distinctive, it is not recognized as a trademark. 17 . . 
The "primary meaning" of a descriptive term is what it describes. The 
"secondary meaning" 'of that term indicates the source ofthe goods; devel-
oped over a period of time, through substantially continuous and exclusive 
use. If one entity makes exclusive use of that term to identify its products 
over a period of time, that term may develop a "secondary meaning." In 
that case, the term becomes distinctive and 'is recognized as a tradem~rk. 
Evidence of exclusive and continuous use of a descriptive term as a mark for 
five years may be accepted by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) as 
prima facie ~videnceof the existence of distinctiveness. 18 The doctrine of 
14. 15 U.s:c. § 1051 (1988). See generally Pegram, Trademark Law Revision: Section 44. 
78 TRADEMARK REP. 141 (1988); Sacoff, TlJe Trademark Use Requirement in Trademark 
Registration. Opposition and Cancellation Proceedings. 76 TRADEMARK REP. 99 (i 986). 
15. 15 U.S.c. §§ 1057(b), 1072 (1988). 
16. I J.T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARK LAw §§ 11.3, 11.22 (2d ed. 1984). See generally Aber-
crombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 E2d 4 (2d Cit, 1976) ... 
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1988). . 
18. [d. § 1052(0. 
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secondary meaning,- however, does not apply to generic terms because such 
terms cannot be appropriated for use as marks. 
C. The Role of the Courts 
Design protection cases under trademark and unfair competition law 
reach the courts in three principal ways: (I) appeals to the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit from a PTO refusal to register a mark; (2) cases 
involving infringement of registered trademarks brought directly to either 
state or federal courts; and (3) cases involving unregistered trademarks and 
similar unfair competition claims under federal law brought directly to 
either state or federal courts. Appeals from decisions of the federal district 
courts in trademark cases usually are appealable to the appropriate regional 
court of appeals, not to the Federal Circuit. 19 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION PROTECTION OF PRODUCT CONFIGURATIONS 
Prior to 1964, some configurations of goods were protected under state 
unfair competition laws. Although some of those designs may have been so 
arbitrary that distinctiveness was not an issue, in most cases, secondary 
meaning was the test used to determine whether the design performed as a 
mark to indicate the source of the goods. This test was analogous to the test 
for determining whether trademark rights had developed in a descriptive 
word or group of words, such that they qualified as "not merely" descrip-
tive. 20 Functional designs, like generic words, were not protected but were 
free for all to use .. The test for infringement was likelihood of confusion. 
A. What Designs Should Be Freefor All to Use? 
The principal subject of product and container design litigation has 
been the scope of func"tionality, that is, whether a particular configuration 
should be free for all to use. In the 1938 decision of Kellogg Co. v. National 
Biscuit CO.,21 the Supreme Court denied design protection to the pillow-like 
shape of Shredded Wheat cereal, explaining the underlying proposition as 
follows: 
Where an article may be rnanufactured by all, a particular 
manufacturer can no rnore assert exclusive rights in a forrn in 
which the public has become accustorned to see the article and 
which, in the minds of the public, is primarily associated with the 
article rather than a particular producer, than it can in the case of 
19. The exception is that an appeal in a case which also involves an issue under the patent 
laws is to the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.c. § 1295 (1988). 
20. Cf In re Deister Concentrator Co .• 289 F.2d 496.503 (C.C.P.A. 1961). 
21. 305 U.S. III (1938). . 
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a name with similar connections in the public mind. Kellogg 
Company was free to use the pillow-shaped form, subject only to 
the obligation to identify its product lest it be mistaken for that of 
the plaintiff. 22 . 
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In 1964, two cases reached the Supreme Court involving protection 
against copying of product appearance under state unfair competition laws. 
These cases were Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel CO.,23 involving a popular 
"pole lamp," and Compco Corp. v. Day Brite Lighting, Inc.,24 involving a 
fluorescent lighting fixture of a type often found on office ceilings. In both 
cases, the district court held that the products were not protected by federal 
patent or copyright law, but instead protected by a state prohibition of copy-
ing. 25 
Sears and Compco both reversed injunctions against copying on the 
basis of federal preemption by the patent laws. Objecting to state prohibi-
tion of copying for an unlimited term of an article representing too slight an 
advance to be patentable, the Court in Sears stated: 
Sears has been held liable here for unfair competition because 
of a finding of likelihood of confusion based on.ly on the fact that 
Sears' lamp was copied from Stiffers unpatented lamp and that 
consequently the two looked exactly alike. Of course there could 
be "confusion" as to who had manufactured these nearly identical 
articles. But mere inability of the public to tell two identicaL arti-
cles apart is not enough to support an injunction against copying or 
an award of damages for copying that which the federaL patent Laws 
permit to be copied. Doubtless a State may, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, require that goods, whether patented or unpatented, 
be labeled or that other precautionary steps be taken to prevent 
customers from being misled as to the source, just as it may pro-
tect businesses in the use of their trademarks, labels, or distinc-
tive dress in the packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by 
imitating such markings, from misleading· purchasers as to the 
source of the goods. But because of the federal patent laws a State 
may not, when the article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, pro-
hibit the copying of the article itself or award damages for such 
copying. 26 
In Compco, the Court acknowledged the trial court's finding of second-
ary meaning in the ribbing which associated the design with the plaintiff,27 
22. [d. at 120. 
23. 376 U.S. 225 ( 1964). 
24. 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
25. Sears. 376 U.S. at 232-33: Compco. 376 U.S. at 238. 
26. Sears. 376 U.S. at 232-33 (emphasis added). 
27. Compco. 376 U.S. at 238. 
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and further, that actual confusion had existed between purchasers. 28 None-
theless, as in Sears, the Court held that when the design is not entitled to a 
design patent or other federal statutory protection, it can be copied at will. 29 
The elimination by Sears and Compeo of industrial design protection 
under state unfair competition law was considered a devastating loss by 
practitioners seeking design protection for clients. It appeared that the 
Sears and Compeo decisions precluded protection of product configurations 
under state unfair competition law, and the potential for configuration pro-
tection under existing federal law was as yet unrecognized. 
B. A Federal Law of Unfair Competition 
In the wake of Sears and Compeo, practitioners sought "other federal 
statutory protection," and turned to the Lanham Act, partic'ularly section 
43(a).30 Literally, section 43(a) addresses false designations of origins and 
false descriptions, and does not appear applicable to protection of unregis-
tered trademarks and the configurations of goods. Nonetheless, the section 
has been widely interpreted by the lower courts to create, in essence, a fed-
erallaw of unfair competition and now provides relief against infringement 
of unregistered trademarks, and unfair competition arising from copying of 
trade dress and certain configurations of goods. 31 
C. The Standard of Functionality 
The key issue in determining the registrability of product 
configurations as trademarks, and their protectability under section 43(a), 
has been functionality. A leading case on the procedure for determining 
functionality of product configurations is In re Deister Concentrator CO.,32 
which was decided by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) in 
1961, before the Sears and Compeo decisions. 
Deister involved an application to register a rhombic shape, represent-
ing the outline of the working surface of a table used for ore concentrating 
and coal cleaning. The table was what is known as a shaker table as shown 
in Figure 1 below. 33 
28. Id. at 237. 
29. Id. at 238. 
30. See generally McCarthy, Important Trends in Trademark and Unfair Competition Law 
During the Decade of the 1970s, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 93 (1981) (hereinafter McCarthy, 
Important Trends). 
31. TRC Report, supra note 7, at 426; see also S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 
(1988); H.R. REP. No. 1028, IOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1988) (citing TRC Report, supra 
note 7). 
32. 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961). Regarding functionality, see generally Oddi, The Func-
tions of "Functionality" in Trademark Law, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 308 (1986); Zelnick, 
The Doctrine of "Functionality," 73 TRADEMARK REP. 128 (1983). 
33. Deister, 289 F.2d at 497. 
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Figure I 
The Deister court set forth four "truisms" as applicable to product 
configuration cases: 
(I) Trademarks enable one to determine the existence of 
common source; but not everything that enables one to determine 
source is a trademark. 
(2) A trademark distinguishes one man's goods from the 
goods of others; but not everything that enables goods to be so dis-
tinguished will be protected as a trademark. 
(3) Some trademarks are words or configurations which are 
protected because they have acquired a "secondary meaning"; but 
not every word or configuration that has a de facto "secondary 
meaning" is protected as a trademark. 
(4) A feature dictated solely by"functional" (utilitarian) con-
siderations may not be protected as a trademark; but mere posses-
sion of a function (utility) is not sufficient reason to deny protec-
tion. 34 
The court distinguished between "functional shapes that are never capable 
of being monopolized, even if they become 'distinctive of the applicant's 
goods,' and shapes which can be monopolized because they are of such an 
arbitrary nature that the law does not recognize a right in the public to copy 
them, even if some incidental function is associated with them."35 The 
problem in determining the registrability and protectability of product 
configurations as trademarks under section 43(a), however, lies between the 
34. [d. at 502. 
35. [d. al 503, 506. 
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two groups of configurations suggested by the court's fourth truism. While 
Deister made reference to the existence of these types of configurations in 
that truism, it had no need to examine this area, and its references to it are 
dicta. Moreover, the court found no indication in the record that the shape 
was either arbitrary or inte'nded to indicate origin, and in fact found that the 
rhombic shape at issue "perfectly ·exemplifie(dj ... a functional or utilitar-
ian shape which is incapable of acquiring a legally recognizable 'secondary 
meaning.' .. 36 As such, the court affirmed the refusal of registration of the 
rhombic shape. 
The 1976 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 
Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp.37 represents a major mile-
stone in the development of federal trademark-type protection of product 
configurations. In that case, Fruehauf claimed the right to copy the exterior 
of a competitor's trailer, the "Cornhusker 800" (see Figure 2 below), relying 
primarily upon Sears and Compco. 38 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that nei-
ther case was controlling, and that the law of trademarks and the issues of 
functionality and secondary meanin~ had not been before the Supreme 




Following the Deister analysis, at least in part, the Truck Equipment 
court relied upon the defendant's own engineering report, which described 
the characteristic sloping end walls of the trailer as useless, and held that 
those walls were nonfunctional. 40 The court's decision represents a case 
near the other extreme from Deister, because the design at issue was consid-
ered arbitrary. 
In 1982 the CCPA decided III re Morton-Norwich Products. Inc.,41 
which further clarified the law applicable to registration of product 
36. Id. at 505. 
37. 536F.2d 121O(8thCir. 1976). 
38. Id. at 1214. 
39. /d. 
40. "Morar' issues are often found in configuration cases and may affect the outcome. In 
Truck Equipment, photographs of plaintiff's trailer had been used in defendant's sales lit-
erature. [d. at 1221. 
41. 671 F. 2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
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configurations as trademarks, and appeared to lit>eralize that law. Morton-
Norwich involved the shape of a spray container used for cleansers,. for which 
the applicant owned both a design and utiHty patent. 42 This design fell i,n 
the middle of the range between one entirely determined by function, as .in 
Deister, and an arbitrary one, as in Truck Equipment. For a diagram of the 
spray container, see Figure 3 below. 
Figure 3 
In an opinion written by Judge Rich, also the author of the Deister 
opinion, the Morton-Norwich court reversed a Trademark Office holding that 
the design was functional and remanded the application for a finding on the 
issue of distinctiveness. 43 The court undertook to define functionality, first 
by distinguishing between de facto and de jure functionality, a distinction 
suggested by the fourth Deister truism. In that regard, the court indicated 
that de facto functionality amounts to functionality in the layman's sense, 
being "the normal or characteristic action of anything.,,44 Functional, in 
the lay sense, indicates that "although the design of a product, a container, 
or a feature of either is directed to the performance of a function, it may be 
legally recognized as an indication of source. ,,45 De jure functionality was 
the term applied in Morton-Nonvich to indicate that a design-as a legal 
consequence-could not be protected as a trademark, and served as a basis 
for the court's remand.46 
Morton-Norwich made two additions to the Deister truisms. First, the 
court indicated that "a discussion of 'functionality' is always in reference to 
42. /d. 
43, M.at 1334. 
44. Id. 
45. /d. at 1337, 
46. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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the design of the thing under consideration (in the sense of its appearance) 
and not the thing itself."47 Next, the court noted that "a nondistinctive 
design does not necessarily equal a 'functional' design."48 The court also 
redefined "arbitrary" in connection with the second truism, distinguishing it 
from the typical trademark (distinctiveness) use of the word.49 
The key to an understanding of the Morton-Norwich decision is that the 
effect on competition issue was viewed by the court as the crux of its analy-
sis. 50 The court resolved the question of de jure functionality by determin-
ing whether the "plastic spray bottle ... [was] ... the best or one of a few 
superior designs available. ,,51 No evidence was found in the record that "the 
shape of appellant's bottle was required to be as it [was] for any de facto 
functional reason, which might lead to an affirmative determination of de 
jure functionality."52 The court explained that competitors' bottles for simi-
lar products demonstrated that "the same functions can be performed by a 
variety of other shapes with no sacrifice of any functional advantage.,,53 As 
a result, the court concluded that "[c]ompetitors have apparently had no 
need to simulate appellant's trade dress, in whole or in part, in order to 
enjoy all of the functional aspects of a spray top container."54 
The design protection bar had hoped that the Supreme Court would 
address the applicability of section 43(a) to product aPfearance in a 1982 
case, Inwood Laboratories. Inc. v. Ives Laboratories. Inc. 5 Inwood involved 
colored drug capsules which several generic drug manufacturers began 
copying after the drug patent expired. 56 The court of appeals had 
addressed only a claim under Lanham Act section 3257 that the defendants 
had induced pharmacists to infringe upon plaintiff's registered trademark, 
CYCLOSPASMOL, and did not reach the section 43(a) claim. 58 Thereafter, 
the Supreme Court reversed the lower court on procedural grounds, and 
remanded for consideration of the section 43(a) and state unfair competition 
claims. 59 Given this reversal, a discussion of appearance was limited to a 
concurring opinion by Justice White, joined by Justice Marshall, which 
addressed the district court's express finding that the capsule color was 
functional in helping patients and physicians identify the drug. 6O 
47. Id. at 1338 (emphasis in original). 




52. Id. at 1342 (emphasis in original). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. (emphasis in original). 
55. 456 US. 844 (1982). 
56. Id. at 846-47. 
57. 15 US.c. § 1114 (1988). 
58. Inwood, 456 US. at 853. 
59. Id. at 858-59. 
60. Id. at 859, 862-64. On remand. the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the dis-
trict court dismissing the § 43{a) and state law claims based on that court's findings of 
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D. The Honeywell Cases 
The shift toward greater federal protection of designs under trademark 
law is .best illustrated by two cases, both captioned In re Honeywell. 61 In 
1968, Honeywell applied to register the configuration of a round thermostat 
cover as a trademark for thermostats. 62 At that time Honeywell had a 
design patent on the thermostat as well as two utility patents. The design 
patent expired on schedule in 1970 while the trademark application63 was 
under examination.64 On the second and final appeal to the CCPA regard-
ing that application, the court quoted from the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board's (TTAB) decision under review, as stating well the basis for refusing 
registration: 
There are only so many basic shapes in which a thermostat or its 
cover can be made ... namely, squares, rectangles, or "rounds" 
with the latter probably being the most utilitarian configuration of 
them all . . . . This is demonstrated by the widespread use over 
the years of round-shaped control devices for appliances and simi-
lar equipment. The fact that thermostat covers may be produced 
in other forms or shapes does not and cannot detract from the 
functional character of the configuration here involved. In sum, 
the overall configuration of applicant's thermostat cover, as pre-
sented for registration, is essentially functional in character and, 
as such, it does not possess the necessary attributes of a proprie-
tary trademark necessary for registration. A registration thereof 
with the presumption afforded under Section 7(b) of the Trade-
mark Statute would be inconsistent with the avowed and desired 
purpose of preserving the freedom to copy functional features of a 
device long protected both under common law and by statutory 
interpretation of what constitutes a registrable trademark. 65 
Later, in 1986, Honeywell applied for trademark registration of a 
slightly different round thermostat cover configuration. 66 This application 
was refused by the examiner on the basis of the res judicata effect of the ear-
lier determination of functionality. On appeal, the TTAB noted that the 
applicant never had an opportunity to introduce additional evidence in the 
prior case, and that the new record reflected events in the marketplace dur-
ing the seventeen years since the original application record was closed. 
The TTAB further noted that the mark in the new application differed from 
functionality and lack of secondary meaning. 72 TRADEMARK REP. 117 (1982). 
61. 532 F.2d 180 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Honeywell I); 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600 (T.T.A.B. 1988) 
(HoneywellI/). 
62. Honeywell I. 532 F.2d at 181. 
63. Id. at 181 n.3. 
64. Honeywell 1/. 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603. 
65. Honeywell I. 532 F.2d at 182-83. 
66. Honeywell 1/. 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1601 n.l. 
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the earlier one because it disclaimed the transparent window and, therefore, 
lacked the issue of visibility of the temperature controlling and indicating 
mechanism. 67 Thus. the TTA B concluded that res jud icata did not bar con-
sideration of the new application. For a diagram of the thermostat dial, see 
Figure 4 below. 
Figure 4 
The ITAB then considered factors discussed in Morton-Norwich, and 
concluded that although the number of alternative designs is limited, the 
Examining Attorney for the PTO had not demonstrated by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the cover was de jure functional. Accordingly, the 
PTO's refusal to register was reversed. til! 
E. Aesthetic Functionality 
"Aesthetic functionality" is based upon the theory that when goods are 
bought largely for their aesthetic value, the aesthetic features may be con-
sidered functional because they contribute to that value. The determination 
of de jure functionality under this theory appears similar to other function-
ality tests, namely, whether or not prohibition of imitation by others will 
substantially hinder them in competition.tll) 
67. /d. at 1601-03. 
68. Id. at 1603-05. 
69. See generally Fletcher. The Defense of "FIII/ctiol/at" Trademark Use: If What Is Filllc-
tiona I Canl/ot Be a Trademark. How Cal/ a Trademark Be Fllnctional? 75 TRADEMARK 
REP. 249 (1985); Duft. "Aesthetic" FIII/ctiol/ality. 73 TRADEMARK REP. 151 (1983). 
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In Pagliero v. Wallace China CO.,70 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit refused protection against copying of floral designs on dinner plates 
sold to restaurants as replacements for broken dishes. The court stated: uIf 
the particular feature is an important ingredient in the commercial success 
of the product, the interest in free competition permits its imitation in the 
absence of a patent or copyright.'>71 
The aesthetic functionality theory has not been widely accepted in 
other circuits. 72 Moreover, the theory was restricted by the Ninth Circuit in 
Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Ellterprises. IIIC.,13 wherein the court affirmed 
the protection of Vuitton's VL and floral logo design, which was repeated 
over the surface of luggage and handbags. 
IV. THE BONITO DECISION 
The recent unanimous Supreme Court decision in Bonito Boats. Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats. Inc. 74 confirms the vitality of the Sears and Compeo 
decisions. Like those earlier decisions, Bonito held that federal patent law 
preempted a state law which removed from public use something the public 
would have been free to use under the patent law. The Florida statute which 
the Court struck down in Bonito prohibited the knowing sale of boat hulls 
made by direct molding, also known as plug molding. 75 
The dicta in Bonito is relevant to the present discussion in several respects. 
First, Bonito holds that "Congress may not create patent monopolies of unlim-
ited duration .... ,,76 In addition, Bonito explains that federal patent law, 
including design patent law, embodies "a careful balance between the need to 
promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through 
imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a com-
petitive economy.'m Finally, Bonito emphasizes the policy that "the ultimate 
goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public 
domain through disclosure ... 78 The Court stated, "We have long held that after 
the expiration of a federal patent, the subject matter of the patent passes to the 
free use of the public as a matter of federallaw.,,79 In the context of the balance 
struck in the patent laws over 200 years, the Court noted that U[a]t the heart of 
Sears and Compco is the conclusion that the efficient operation of the federal pat-
ent system depends upon substantially free trade in publicly known, unpatented 
design and utilitarian conceptions.',8o 
70. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952). 
71. [d. al 343. 
72. See 1.T. McCARTHY. supra nole 16, § 7.26(D) (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 198~). 
73. 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981). 
74. 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
75. Id. at 145. 
76. /d. al 146. 
77. /d. 
78. Id. al 151. 
79. [d. al 152. 
80. Id. al 156. 
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The boat hull in Bonito was characterized by the Court as standing "in 
the same stead as an item for which a patent has expired or been denied: it is 
unpatented and unpatentable.,,8. The Court explained that the protection 
provided by the Florida statute "conflicts with the federal policy 'that all 
ideas in general circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they 
are protected by a valid patent.' ,,82 
Unlike Sears and Compeo, Bonito recognizes the existence of a federal 
law of unfair competition. Nevertheless, the references in Bonito to Sears 
and Compeo do not appear to include the "other federal statutory protec-
tion" language of Compeo83 on which practitioners and lower courts have 
relied in applying the Lanham Act to protection of product configurations. 
For example, Bonito relies upon Sears for the proposition that states "may 
protect business in the use of their trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in 
the packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by imitating such markings, 
from misleading purchasers as to the source of the goods.,,84 However, the 
Bonito Court exhibited a narrow view of the common law of unfair competi-
tion's ability to limit use of a product configuration, stating: 
We believe that the Florida statute at issue in this case so sub-
stantially impedes the public use of the otherwise unprotected 
design and utilitarian idea embodied in unpatented boat hulls as to 
run afoul of the teaching of our decisions in Sears and Compeo. It 
is readily apparent that the Florida statute does not operate to pro-
hibit "unfair competition" in the usual sense that the term is 
understood. The law of unfair competition has its roots in the 
common-law tort of deceit: its general concern is with protecting 
consumers from confusion as to source. While that concern may 
result in the creation of "quasi-property rights" in communicative 
symbols, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not the pro-
tection of producers as an incentive to product innovation. Judge 
Hand captured the distinction well in Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn 
& Bishop Co. where he wrote: 
"[T]he plaintiff has the right not to lose his custom-
ers through false representations that those are his wares 
which in fact are not, but he may not monopolize any 
design or pattern, however trifling. The defendant, on the 
other hand, may copy plaintiff's goods slavishly down to 
the minutest detail: but he may not represent himself as 
the plaintiff in their sale."8s 
8J. Id. at 159. 
82. Id. (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969». 
83. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964). 
84. Bonito, 489 U.S. at 154 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 
(1964». 
85. Id. at 157 (citation omitted). 
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Bonito's lack of acknowledgement of the current extent of design 
protection under unfair competition law is perhaps best reflected by the next 
paragraph of its opinion: 
With some notable exceptions, including the interpretation of 
the Illinois law of unfair competition at issue in Sears and Compco, 
the common-law tort of unfair competition has been limited to pro-
tection against copying of nonfunctional aspects of consumer prod-
ucts which have acquired secondary meaning such that they operate 
as a designation of source. The '!protection" granted a particular 
design under the law of unfair competition is thus limited to one 
context where consumer confusion is likely to result; the design 
"idea" itself may be freely exploited in all other contexts. 86 
While the Bonito opinion did refer to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 
it did so in a way that reflects either a naivete, or perhaps, an unwillingness 
to accept the extent to which design protection has been extended in the 
name of that statute: 
Indeed, there are affirmative indications from Congress that 
both the law of unfair competition and trade secret protection are 
consistent with the balance struck by the patent laws. Section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act creates a federal remedy for making "a 
false designation of origin, or any false description or representa-
tion, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe 
or represent the same .... " Congress has thus given federal 
recognition to many of the concerns which underlie the state tort 
of unfair competition, and the application of Sears and Compco to 
nonfunctional aspects of a product which have been shown to 
identify source must take account of competing federal policies in 
this regard. 87 
It should be noted that Bonito reached the Supreme Court because of a 
conflict between the Florida Supreme Court's holding that federal law pre-
empted the state plug mold statute and the Federal Circuit's conclusion in 
Inter part Corp. v. [talia, 88 that a similar California law posed no threat to the 
federal patent laws. 89 The Supreme Court's Bonito decision implicitly 
rejects the Inter part decision, and expressly rejects the Federal Circuit's 
proposition that the patent laws" 'say nothing about the right to copy or the 
right to use.' ,,90 Moreover, the Bonito Court's decision emphasized the 
86. /d. at 157-58 (citations omitted). 
87. Jd. at 166 (citations omitted). It is doubtful that Congress intended the scope of protec-
tion now extended to designs under § 43(a). See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying 
text. 
88. 777 F.2d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
89. Bonito. 489 U.S. at 143-44. 
90. Jd. at 163 (quoting Jnterpart. 777 F.2d at 685). 
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federal power over patent law, characterizing the federal standards as an 
expression of a congressional determination that the states simply could not 
ignore.9• 
V. COMMENTARY ON THE APPROPRIATENESS OF PROTECTING 
PRODUCT CONFIGURATIONS UNDER TRADEMARK LAW 
Attention now turns from what the law is, to where the law is going. 
Primarily at issue is whether federal trademark registrations and unfair 
competition law are appropriate methods to protect product configurations. 
Relevant to such an inquiry are three principal problem areas: the absence 
of any limitation of term of protection, the uncertainty regarding where the 
line of protectability should be drawn, and problems relating to secondary 
meaning. 
A. Limited Term 
It is clear that the founders of our nation intended to limit monopolies, 
since the federal government was granted only the power to secure to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and dis-
coveries for "limited times."92 A sense of the meaning of "limited times" in 
our Constitution may be determined by inspection of the patent and copy-
right laws in force in Great Britain when our Constitution was written, and 
of those which were first adopted in this country. 
The British Statute of Monopolies of 162493 provided a patent term of 
fourteen years.94 The 1709 Statute of Queen Anne95 had set the term of 
British copyright at fourteen years, with the possibility of a fourteen-year 
renewal if the author was living at the end of the first term. 96 The first 
United States patent97 and copyright98 statutes, both adopted in 1790, pro-
vided the same periods of protection as their British counterparts. 99 
91. Id. at 164-65. 
92. "Congress shall have Power ... to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 8. 
93. Great Britain. Statutes at Large, 21 Jac. I, ch.3 (1624). 
94. Id. This was the term for new patents. The term for patents in effect at the time of 
enactment was 21 years. See generally Armitage, Tim Hundred Years of English Patent 
Law, in Two HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 5, at 4; B.W. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF 
AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 39,54-55 (1967). 
95. Great Britain, Statutes at Large, 8 Anne. ch.19 (1709). 
96. Id. See general/y Stewart, Tim Hundred Years of English Copyright Law, in Two HUN-
DRED YEARS. supra note 5, at 81; B.W. BUGBEE. supra note 94. at 53-55. 
97. Act of Apr. 10. 1790. I Stat. 109. 
98. Act of May 31. 1790. I Stat. 124. 
99. See generally Forman, 7i,'0 Hundred Years of American Patent Law. in Two HUNDRED 
YEARS, supra note 5, at 28-29; Ringer. TI"o Hundred Years of American Copyright Law, 
in Two HUNDRED YEARS. supra note 5. at 127; B.W. BUGBEE. supra note 94. at 144. 
146. Some have speculated that the multiples of seven years were based on seven-year 
apprenticeships. which were common in the 17th and 18th centuries. Thus, a reason-
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The Supreme Court has strictly construed the "limited times" provi-
sion. For example, in 1829, the Court held that one cannot obtain a patent 
after the public has been permitted to freely use the subject of the patent. 100 
Later, in 1896, the Court held that" 'on the expiration of a patent the monop-
oly granted by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly 
covered by the patent becomes public property. It is upon this condition that 
the patent is granted."oIOI Bonito continues this strict construction,102 by 
stating: "Sears and Compco extended that rule to potentially patentable 
ideas which are fully exposed to the public.,,103 
In the case of trademarks, there is no limitation of term, and protection 
continues for as long as use does. 104 Although this unlimited term is admit-
tedly appropriate for most conventional trademarks, it is doubtful whether 
an unlimited term is appropriate for industrial design configurations which 
have a de facto functional aspect, albeit perhaps less than the de jure 
functionality defined in Morton-Norwich. 105 The ultimate answer to this 
issue may depend upon where the line of protection is drawn. 
B. Where Should the Line Be Drawn? 
The usual justifications for extending federal trademark protection to 
product configurations include those stated in Truck Equipment. One 
justification is that the language of Sears and Compco regarding permissible 
state regulation of labeling is mere dicta. 106 Another is to distinguish the 
types of protection, as was done in Truck Equipme1lt: 
The protection accorded by the law of trademark and unfair 
competition is greater than that accorded by the law of patents 
because each is directed at a different purpose. The latter protects 
inventive activity which, after a term of years, is dedicated to the 
public domain. The former protects commercial activity which, 
in our society, is essentially private. 107 
Some proponents of section 43(a) and trademark registration protection of 
product configurations classify those provisions of the Lanham Act within 
able term of an exclusive right granted in exchange for disclosure of intellectual effort 
was the length of two to four apprenticeships. 
100. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) I (1829). Current law provides a one year grace 
period before filing is required. 35 U.S.c. § 102(b) (1982). 
10 I. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. III. 120 (1938) (quoting Singer Mfg. Co. 
v. June Mfg. Co .. 163 U.S. 169.185 (1896». 
102. Bonito Boats. Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats. Inc .. 489 U.S. 141. 165 (1989). 
103. Id. 8111 see McCarthy. Important Trends. slIpra note 30. at 96 nn.7-8. 
104. In the case of registrations. the formality of a declaration of use and renewal applica-
tions is required. 15 US.c. §§ 1058-1059 (1988). 
105. See slIpra notes 40-53 and accompanying text. 
106. Truck Equip. Servo CO. V. Fruehauf Corp .. 536 E2d 1210. 1214. 1215 n.6 (8th Cir. 
1976). 
107. /d. at 1215. 
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the "design patent or other federal statutory protection" without which, 
Compeo explains, a design can be copied at will. 108 
When evaluating cases involving claims of unfair competition under 
state law, the Supreme Court has repeatedly examined whether the subject 
matter is of the type addressed by the patent and copyright laws. In Sears, 
Compeo, and Bonito, the Court held that state protection was preempted by 
the federal patent and copyright laws. 109 Is there any reason to believe that 
the Court would not consider the relative scope of the patent and copyright 
laws in evaluating a claim to trademark law protection of a design? 
The Sears, Compeo, and Bonito decisions constitute dicta insofar as 
they go beyond their preemption holdings. Nevertheless, it would be unwise 
to ignore any of the language in those Supreme Court decisions when 
attempting to determine where the Supreme Court would draw the line 
delineating permissible protection of product and container configurations. 
Sears and Compeo appeared to focus on the use of traditional" 'trademarks, 
labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods.' ,,110 While recognizing 
the existence of section 43(a) and other unfair competition protection related to 
designs, Bonito also takes this restrictive position. 
In discussing section 43(a), Bonito appears to have used "nonfunctional" 
in a de facto sense in referring to nonfunctional aspects of a product which 
have been shown to identify source. Similarly, when discussing the 
justifications offered for plug mold statutes, the Court stated, "Where an item 
in general circulation is unprotected by patent, '[r]eproduction of a functional 
attribute is legitimate competitive activity.' "III Such references, directed to 
the functional aspect or attribute of a product rather than the product as a 
whole, do not reflect the type of evaluation involved in a determination of de 
jure functionality as found, for example, in Morton-Norwieh. 112 In fact, the 
Bonito Court expressly notes Congress' refusal to enact legislation in the area 
of design protection stating: 
Congress has considered extending various forms of limited 
protection to industrial design either through the copyright laws or 
by relaxing the restrictions on the availability of design patents. 
Congress explicitly refused to take this step in the copyright laws, 
and despite sustained criticism for a number of years, it has declined 
to alter the patent protections presently available for industrial 
108. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 US. 234,238 (1964). 
109. Bonito distinguished the contractual protection of trade secrets which was approved in 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470 (1970) and Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 
440 US. 257 (1979) as regulation not inconsistent with the patent law. Bonito Boats, 
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 US. 141, 155-57 (1989). 
110. Bonito, 489 US. at 154 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 US. 225, 232 
(1964». 
I I I. Bonito, 489 US. at 164 (quoting Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 
456 US. 844, 863 (1982) (White, 1, concurring». 
112. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
1989] Scope of Protection 
design. It is for Congress to determine if the present system of 
design and utility patents is ineffectual in promoting the useful arts 
in the context of industrial design. 113 
C. The Problems with Developing Secondary Meaning 
351 
The final problems regarding trademark protection of product 
configurations to be discussed in this Article are two relating to secondary 
meaning. In order to obtain trademark law protection for. a design which is 
not totally arbitrary, secondary meaning must be shown through substantially 
continuous and exclusive use over a period of time, usually measured in 
years. 114 Unless there is some other form of protection, the design will be 
unprotected while that secondary meaning develops. Thus, trademark protec-
tion is less than satisfactory for most new product configurations, and, without 
protection at the outset, copiers can prevent the creation of secondary mean-
ing. 115 
That leads to the principal problem with secondary meaning: trademark 
protection of a design following a period of protection of another kind, for 
example, a design patent. What happens to the right to freely copy at the expi-
ration of a patent, which was emphasized in Bonito, is unclear. 116 If secondary 
meaning is meant to represent the lack of competitors' need to use a design, it 
is unclear whether someone can develop secondary meaning during a period 
when the lack of competition is due to some other form of intellectual property 
protection. 117 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Bonito opinion reminds us that Congress has yet to enact a design 
law based on registration and that, should a case of product configuration pro-
tection under federal trademark law reach the Supreme Court, the scope of 
protection granted may be considerably less than that afforded by Morton-Nor-
wich. In sum, trademark protection of product configuration is not a sure 
thing. 
113. Bonito. 489 U.S. at 167-68 (citations omitted). 
114. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
115. Problems such as this have led some courts to protect "secondary meaning in the mak-
ing." See generally Scagnelli. Dawn of a New Doctrine?-Trademark Protection for 
Incipient Secondary Meaning. 71 TRADEMARK REP. 527 (1981). 
116. See Bonito. 489 U.S. at 154-56. 
117. This question was involved in the Honeywell cases. See supra notes 61-68 and accom-
panying text. 
